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Empirical Article
To some extent, people interpret emotionally ambiguous 
situations in benign or negative directions instead of main-
taining their inherent ambiguity. The extent to which the 
interpretation is negative instead of benign has been asso-
ciated primarily with measures of anxiety (e.g., Eysenck, 
Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Hirsch & Mathews, 
2000) but occasionally with dysphoria or depression (Hertel 
& El-Messidi, 2006; Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002). 
More recently, by using procedures called cognitive-bias 
modification (CBM), investigators have gone beyond these 
bias demonstrations to establish causal connections from 
the bias to features of emotional disorders (see the review 
by Hertel & Mathews, 2011). In our view, interpretation 
bias should be instrumental in the development and main-
tenance of one feature of depression in particular: the ten-
dency to ruminate or to think repetitively about one’s 
problems and oneself in relation to those problems.
Rumination is a maladaptive and prevalent traitlike 
feature of depressive disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, 
& Lyubomirsky, 2008). Ruminators tend to perceive their 
problems as debilitating and focus on themselves to the 
detriment of solution-focused behavior. Recent frame-
works for understanding rumination have suggested that 
trait rumination is maintained by cognitive biases that 
make negative content more accessible and create a 
vicious cycle of ruminative thinking and negative affect 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Rumination-related cog-
nitive biases—revealed through correlations—have been 
found mostly in attention and memory tasks. For exam-
ple, ruminators have trouble controlling attention away 
from irrelevant self-related or emotional content (e.g., 
Daches, Mor, Winquist, & Gilboa-Schechtman, 2010; 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). Similarly, depressive rumina-
tion has been linked to enhanced retrieval of negative 
memories (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
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Abstract
To understand cognitive bases of self-reported ruminative tendencies, we examined interpretations and subsequent 
memories of ambiguous situations depicting opportunities for rumination. In Experiment 1, we recruited students, 
randomly assigned them to a distracting or ruminative concentration task, and then measured their latencies to 
complete fragments that resolved situational ambiguity in either a ruminative or a benign direction. Students in the 
ruminative task condition who previously self-identified as brooders were quicker to complete ruminative fragments. 
In Experiment 2, we simulated this bias to investigate its possible contribution to rumination; nonbrooding students 
were trained to make ruminative or benign resolutions of ambiguous situations. Ruminative training led to more 
negative continuations of new, potentially ruminative situations in a subsequent transfer task. Next, ruminative training 
also caused more negatively valenced errors in recalling the ambiguous transfer situations. Finally, after reflection 
about a personal experience, state-rumination scores were higher in the ruminative condition. These results establish 
the causal role of interpretation biases in ruminative patterns of thought.
Keywords
rumination, interpretation bias, cognitive-bias modification, brooding
Received 8/26/13; Revision accepted 3/3/14
Rumination and Cognitive-Bias Modification 715
1998) and negative self-related material (Moulds, Kandris, 
& Williams, 2007) and to overgeneral autobiographical 
memories (Debeer, Hermans, & Raes, 2009; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2004).
Two subtypes of rumination have been identified: 
reflection and brooding (Treynor, Gonzales, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). Reflection involves purposefully turn-
ing inward to engage in problem solving and alleviate 
depressive symptoms. Brooding, in contrast, involves 
self-critical and evaluative thinking about the self. 
Brooding, but not reflection, has been associated with a 
variety of negative outcomes, such as increased depres-
sion over time (Treynor et al., 2003) and maladaptive 
coping strategies (Burwell & Shirk, 2007). Cognitive 
biases, such as the ones reported earlier, are often spe-
cific to brooding (Bernblum & Mor, 2010; De Lissnyder, 
Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010).
To date, only a few studies have focused on interpre-
tive biases associated with rumination. In a very recent 
study (Mor, Hertel, Ngo, Shachar, & Redak, 2014), brood-
ing and nonbrooding students performed a lexical deci-
sion task similar to the one first used by Richards and 
French (1992) to show interpretation biases in anxiety. 
Students judged the lexical status of targets that were 
each related to either the ruminative or the benign mean-
ing of the preceding homographic prime. In this type of 
lexical decision task, decision times are faster when the 
initial interpretation of the homograph is consistent with 
the upcoming target (e.g., bitter/angry vs. bitter/lemon). 
Accordingly, students who reported a higher degree of 
habitual rumination produced faster decision times for 
the ruminative targets but not for other targets with nega-
tive and threatening meanings. These data were informa-
tive but incapable of addressing the possible causal 
directions involved.
Causal connections among rumination and cognitive 
phenomena were perhaps first explored by experimen-
tally manipulating state rumination and observing the 
cognitive and emotional consequences (for a review, see 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). For example, we know 
that dysphoric students who underwent a rumination 
induction recalled more homographs that they had inter-
preted personally—bitter, strain, vent—than did partici-
pants in other conditions (Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006). 
Such experiments reveal consequences of rumination but 
tell us nothing about why people think in ruminative pat-
terns in the first place. When investigators approached a 
similar issue regarding possible cognitive contributions to 
anxiety, they developed CBM procedures to simulate or 
modify interpretation biases to provide evidence that 
interpretation biases influence features of the disorder 
(for a review, see Hertel & Mathews, 2011).
We therefore revised the typical CBM procedure used to 
modify interpretation bias in anxiety to suit our goal of 
investigating the mechanisms of ruminative habits. Several 
investigators have reported modifications of interpretation 
biases that are potentially applicable to depression 
(Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; 
Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Reports of appraisal 
modifications are also relevant (e.g., Miller, Rude, & Haner, 
2013; Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009), and one such 
study (although not applying CBM) showed direct effects 
of “big-picture” appraisal on ruminative thought (Rude, 
Mazzetti, Pal, & Stauble, 2011). None that we are aware of, 
however, has targeted negative interpretations of ambiguity 
as a potential cause of rumination. After developing a set of 
ambiguous scenarios with the potential for ruminative res-
olutions, we conducted two experiments: a first experiment 
to document bias in scenario interpretation as a character-
istic of individuals who ruminate and a second experiment 
to simulate the bias to produce rumination-related conse-
quences. Specifically, in the second experiment, we used 
CBM to establish a rumination-related interpretation bias 
and then examined the contribution of those effects to sub-
sequent memory bias and state rumination.
Experiment 1
Building on our previous findings (Mor et al., 2014), in 
Experiment 1 in the current report, we examined the 
rumination-related bias in latencies to complete the frag-
mented final word of ambiguous scenarios. The final 
word disambiguated the meaning of the scenario much 
like targets used by Mor et al. (2014) disambiguated the 
priming homographs. Scenarios, however, are more eco-
logically valid materials for expressing the ambiguity 
found in real-world settings. Moreover, the scenarios 
were modeled after those used by Mathews and 
Mackintosh (2000) in one of the first successful CBM sim-
ulations of interpretation bias in anxiety. Because we 
found their approach useful in considering the design of 
our upcoming simulation experiment, we wished to doc-
ument biases by using the same task in Experiment 1. In 
constructing materials related to a ruminative mental set, 
we focused primarily on situations conducive to thinking 
about oneself in a negative way but that permit other 
viewpoints (e.g., “You have a reunion with your high 
school friends. Everyone is talking about their lives after 
graduation. When you reflect on your own experiences 
in relation to everyone else’s, your difficulties seem 
[unusual/typical].”). We also tried to capture the back-
ward glance that is so intuitively a feature of ruminative 
episodes. In Experiment 1, half of the scenarios ended in 
a fragment that established a ruminative meaning for the 
scenario, and half ended in a way that established a non-
ruminative or benign meaning. We predicted that the 
alacrity in resolving each type would indicate the rumina-
tive status of the participant.
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In documenting the bias, we reasoned that ruminative 
reactions do not dominate every situation that a person 
encounters (Takano, Sakamoto, & Tanno, 2013). 
Participation in a psychology lab to fulfill class require-
ments might well sidestep opportunities for rumination. 
Three specific features of our design therefore were cho-
sen for the purpose of varying ruminative engagement of 
the maladaptive sort. First, we began each session with a 
frequently used concentration task to temporarily induce 
self- or other-focused thinking (e.g., Hertel & El-Messidi, 
2006; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). This self-
focused task has been used for a variety of experimental 
purposes (e.g., to induce a negative mood in dysphoric 
individuals and negative bias in autobiographical remem-
bering; Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). Again, the purpose of 
this manipulation in our experiment was to potentiate a 
ruminative state for those individuals who have the habit 
of ruminating. Second, we directed participants to imag-
ine themselves in scenarios that were written to potenti-
ate maladaptive resolutions. Engagement through 
imagery instructions is a typical feature of bias experi-
ments (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009). Third, we recruited par-
ticipants who scored in the extreme quartiles of the 
Brooding subscale of the Ruminative Response Scale 
(RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) because brood-
ing represented the more maladaptive form of rumina-
tion (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). We predicted that 
students with high brooding scores would be quick to 
resolve scenarios negatively if they came to the task from 
a particularly self-focused perspective.
Method
Participants and design. Undergraduate students 
were asked to complete the RRS during their introductory 
psychology class. Students whose scores on the Brood-
ing subscale fell into the 1st quartile (8 and below) were 
recruited as nonbrooders, whereas those who scored 
within the 4th quartile (13 and above) were recruited as 
brooders. Brooding scores can range from 5 to 20, and 
these cutoffs are similar to those reported in prior 
research (e.g., Bernblum & Mor, 2010; Daches et al., 
2010). Forty students in each brooding category initially 
were selected and randomly assigned to a combination 
of conditions for thought induction (self-focus or distrac-
tion) and counterbalancing materials (rotating negative 
and benign endings between scenarios), with the con-
straint of equal cell sizes. Balancing the mean brooding 
scores across conditions served as an additional con-
straint for assignment of the last several participants. 
After the data from 4 participants were set aside as outli-
ers (2.5 SD from the overall mean latency for either nega-
tive or benign fragments), 4 additional students were 
recruited and randomly assigned as replacements. The 
final sample contained 6 females and 4 males in each 
combination of brooding category, thought induction, 
and condition for counterbalancing materials.1
Materials. The concentration task required two book-
lets to make the task seem separate from the main com-
puter task. One booklet contained 50 self-focusing 
phrases (e.g., “think about: who you are as an individ-
ual”) and the other contained 50 distracting phrases (e.g., 
“think about: the typical layout of a classroom”); each 
phrase was presented separately on a new page. The 
booklets were used by Hertel and El-Messidi (2006) and 
were modifications of Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s 
(1993) materials, which were designed to induce a state 
of rumination in the self-focused condition compared 
with the distraction condition.
A total of 40 scenarios were compiled for the main 
task. Eight were filler scenarios that described nonam-
biguous, nonemotional situations, and 8 were ambiguous 
scenarios capable of being resolved in a socially anxious 
direction (Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000); the latter were included 
as a control for a nonspecific negative bias, and the con-
trol scenarios were used to make our purpose a little less 
obvious. The remaining 24 ambiguous scenarios were 
constructed to invite ruminative thinking; each ended in 
a word that signified either a ruminative resolution or its 
absence. Table 1 contains examples of each type. Each 
potential social-anxiety and ruminative scenario was 
paired with two possible ending words (negative and 
benign), and all words were turned into fragments by 
omitting one to three letters, depending on word length, 
but never the first letter. Each scenario was also associ-
ated with a yes/no question designed to encourage par-
ticipants to read the scenarios before completing the 
fragment. The scenarios were organized into four blocks, 
each of which contained 6 ruminative scenarios (3 end-
ing in negative fragments and 3 ending in benign frag-
ments), 2 social-anxiety scenarios (1 ending each way), 
and 2 filler scenarios. The scenarios assigned to each 
type of ending were fully counterbalanced within each 
cell of the design, and the order of presentation within 
blocks was randomized anew for each participant.
Procedure. The concentration task in Phase 1 was 
described as a pilot study to determine how well people 
can concentrate, and participants were told that ques-
tions would follow the task. They were instructed to read 
the phrase on each page and to concentrate on it by 
using their imagination to visualize the idea represented 
by the phrase. After 10 s, a beep signaled the participants 
to turn to the next page. Afterward, in a task to complete 
the cover story, we had participants rate their perceived 
ability to form images corresponding to the phrases and 
Rumination and Cognitive-Bias Modification 717
to concentrate on the ideas during the allotted time peri-
ods. Finally, as part of the same cover story, they were 
asked to recall five phrases.
The main task in Phase 2 (programmed in Superlab 
Pro 4.07, Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA) was 
described as unrelated to the Phase 1 task. Details of this 
procedure were arranged to be as similar as possible to 
those used by other researchers to measure or manipulate 
interpretation bias; for example, self-involving imagery 
instructions were used (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000). We asked participants to read each scenario, visual-
ize themselves in the situation, and contemplate their 
reaction before pressing the space bar. The bar press 
revealed the word fragment, and participants were 
instructed to type the completing word in a text box that 
appeared below the fragment. We recorded latencies from 
the onset of the fragment to the first letter press. By click-
ing “next,” participants saw the question and typed “yes” 
or “no” in the answer box. Two practice examples were 
completed in the presence of the experimenter. The Beck 
Depression Inventory–II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) was administered after completion of Phase 2. We 
used a version that omitted the “suicide” item. We included 
this self-report of depressed state to examine whether 
there would be reason to suspect that depression would 
predict interpretation bias relevant to our scenarios as 
well as or better than would rumination measures.
Results and discussion
Mean latencies to respond to the 12 negative and 12 
benign scenarios were calculated by omitting error trials 
(M = 4.2%). Then latencies beyond 2.5 SD of each indi-
vidual’s mean for the relevant fragment type were 
removed. The adjusted mean latencies were submitted to 
an analysis of variance with a within-subjects factor for 
fragment type (negative and benign) and between-sub-
jects factors for brooding group (low or high) and con-
centration task (self-focus or distraction). In an attempt to 
reduce error variance, an additional factor was included 
to represent the counterbalancing condition; significant 
effects associated with that factor are not reported.
The only significant effect in the main design was the 
three-way interaction of fragment type, brooding group, 
and task, F(1, 72) = 4.26, MSE = 148,761, p = .04, ηp2 = .06. 
Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 2. 
The interaction was partitioned into simple interactions 
of fragment type and brooding group within each con-
centration condition. In the distraction condition, no dif-
ferences were found (all Fs < 1.0). In the self-focus 
condition, the simple interaction was significant, F(1, 36) = 
5.07, MSE = 123,142, p = .03, ηp2 = .12. Brooders responded 
more quickly to negative fragments than to benign frag-
ments, F(1, 18) = 4.34, MSE = 142,388, p = .052, ηp2 = .19. 
The difference in the nonbrooding group was nonsignifi-
cant (p > .31). These data therefore reveal an interpreta-
tion bias experienced by individuals who report brooding 
but only after an induction of self-focus.
The same analysis was performed on the latencies to 
complete fragments after the social-anxiety scenarios. 
These scenarios have been used to show interpretation 
biases related to trait and social anxiety (e.g., Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000). In the current experiment, however, 
no systematic differences or effects associated with 
Table 1. Scenario Examples
Scenario Benign ending Negative ending Question Benign answer
[Filler/control—Experiments 1 and 2] You 
begin reading a book that you recently 
found around your house. One afternoon 
you are reading it while sitting in the 
recliner. The doorbell rings so you put the 
book down. You think it could be your . . .
ne-ghb-r [neighbor] — Were you watching 
a movie when the 
doorbell rang?
No
[Socially anxious—Experiment 1] You arrange 
to meet a friend in town. Last time you met, 
you had a quarrel. Just before you leave, she 
phones to say that she can’t make it. You 
think that this is because she is feeling . . .
unwe-l [unwell] an—y [angry] Did your friend forgive 
you?
Yes
[Ruminative—Experiments 1 and 2] While 
doing your calculus homework, you 
encountered a problem that you couldn’t 
solve. The next day, you go to class and turn 
it in. Later, you keep thinking about it and 
realize that, during class, everyone seemed 
so . . .
in-ec-re [insecure] co–fid-nt 
[confident]
Did the other students 
encounter problems 
with the homework?
Yes
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brooding and state rumination were found (all ps > .27). 
Thus, the interpretive bias revealed by the ruminative 
scenarios that we created can be viewed as specifically 
ruminative and not generally negative or benign, although 
this specificity should be replicated because few social-
anxiety trials were included in this design.2
An analysis of variance was conducted on the BDI-II 
scores and revealed a significant main effect of brooding 
group, F(1, 76) = 18.45, MSE = 55.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. 
The means reported in Table 2 suggest an effect of self-
focus on the scores in the brooding group, but the main 
effect of concentration task and the interaction were both 
nonsignificant, F < 1.0, as one would expect from a more 
stable measure of dysphoria. Finally and more relevant, 
we examined the correlation between the BDI-II score 
and the valence effect in latencies (benign reaction time 
minus negative reaction time) across all 80 participants 
and within each condition of the concentration task. All 
three correlations were positive, but none was significant 
(p > .20).
Experiment 2
Having produced evidence for rumination-related bias in 
the interpretation of ambiguity, we turned our efforts 
toward its simulation. CBM-interpretation paradigms con-
sist of a training phase in which scores of such scenarios 
are resolved consistently in either the benign or the nega-
tive direction. Then transfer of training is typically evalu-
ated via a measure of the interpretation of new, 
open-ended scenarios. In Experiment 2, we randomly 
assigned 20 participants to each of three training condi-
tions (ruminative, benign, and control) and presented 70 
training scenarios before asking the participants to write 
continuation sentences for 9 new ambiguous scenarios, 
to be judged as expressing negative or benign 
interpretations. Thus, one measure of the success of bias 
simulation is whether participants reveal that bias in simi-
lar but unconstrained situations. Writing a continuation 
for a scenario is less constrained than is filling in letters 
of a predetermined word that functions to resolve 
ambiguity.
Ruminative thought feeds on memories for past events. 
The review by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) documented 
evidence of negative bias in autobiographical memory 
among ruminators or those induced to ruminate. Another 
possible measure of the success of bias training, there-
fore, is the extent to which participants reconstruct 
aspects of past ambiguous events from a negative per-
spective. Emotionally ambiguous events can be remem-
bered negatively through reconstructions mediated by 
interpretation (Bartlett, 1932). A similar phenomenon 
occurs in social anxiety, in which case the memory bias 
clearly results from interpretations made on initial expo-
sure to the events to be remembered (Hertel et al., 2008). 
This sort of reliance of one type of bias on another type 
was first addressed in the combined cognitive-bias 
hypothesis of Hirsch, Clark, and Mathews (2006) and 
applied to cognition in depression (Everaert, Koster, & 
Derakshan, 2012). In fact, evidence of memory bias that 
results from CBM interpretation training has already been 
found (e.g., Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011). We there-
fore predicted that a request to recall the transfer sce-
narios in the current experiment would reveal evidence 
for training-congruent biases of the sort that fuel rumina-
tive thought. In practice, we examined the number of 
intrusions in the recall of the ambiguous scenarios that 
were judged emotionally benign or ruminatively nega-
tive. (Our use of the term intrusion refers to the inclusion 
of nonpresented material or confabulations during 
recall; in this regard, it differs from the term intrusion 
used in the context of intrusive memories that arise in 
Table 2. Results From Experiment 1
Measure
Distraction/low  
brooding
Distraction/high  
brooding
Self-focus/low  
brooding
Self-focus/high 
brooding
Ruminative Response Scale 37.6 (8.4) 59.7 (10.1) 33.8 (6.9) 61.8 (9.2)
 Brooding scale 7.0 (1.0) 15.4 (1.6) 7.2 (0.9) 15.3 (1.7)
 Reflective pondering 9.0 (3.9) 12.9 (3.0) 7.6 (2.5) 13.5 (3.4)
Mean RT: Ruminative  
 Negative fragment 1,708 (669) 1,806 (585) 1,826 (688) 1,586 (395)
 Benign fragment 1,726 (552) 1,674 (406) 1,721 (473) 1,834 (627)
Mean RT: Social anxiety  
 Negative fragment 2,029 (873) 1,916 (752) 2,344 (1,320) 1,934 (981)
 Benign fragment 1,857 (626) 2,115 (1,222) 2,105 (1,186) 1,893 (1,054)
Beck Depression Inventory–II 8.2 (5.5) 15.2 (9.0) 8.8 (5.7) 16.1 (8.8)
Note: n = 20. The table presents means for each measure. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Reaction times (RTs) were measured 
in milliseconds. All group differences in questionnaire measures were significant (p < .001), but other effects were not (p > .13). The Beck 
Depression Inventory–II did not include the “suicide” item.
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consciousness in uninvited ways; e.g., Lang, Moulds, & 
Holmes, 2009.)
Our final predictions concerned state rumination after 
autobiographical recall. In CBM experiments designed to 
simulate cognitive contributions to anxiety, investigators 
have been careful to argue that CBM is not merely a mood-
induction procedure but instead establishes a tendency to 
respond anxiously to potentially stressful situations (e.g., 
Standage, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, 
& Rutherford, 2006). Therefore, as a final “far-transfer” task, 
we examined ruminative reactions to remembering instead 
of anxious reactions to a stressful task. As is often done in 
assessments of state rumination (e.g., Grisham, Flower, 
Williams, & Moulds, 2011), we asked participants to 
describe an unpleasant event from their recent past and 
gave them time to ruminate about it afterward before we 
administered a measure of state rumination. We predicted 
training-congruent effects on that measure. To distinguish 
state rumination from mood, we also asked for ratings for 
various “states of mind” throughout the session to sample 
possible training effects on mood and other states.
Method
Participants and design. As in Experiment 1, we 
screened students in undergraduate psychology classes 
according to their scores on the Brooding subscale of the 
RRS; this time, we recruited students who scored at or 
below the median of 10 (to avoid exacerbating rumina-
tion and negative mood in brooding individuals). For rea-
sons of convenience, we recruited only female students. 
With constraints of equal cell sizes and closely similar cell 
means on the Brooding scale, we randomly assigned 20 
participants to a combination of training (ruminative, 
benign, or control) and a counterbalancing condition for 
rotating the valence of scenario resolution across 12 probe 
trials. Mean scores on the Brooding subscale were 8.2 
(ruminative), 8.3 (benign), and 8.2 (control).
Materials. We developed a set of 70 training scenarios 
(and 70 control scenarios), 9 transfer scenarios, and 5 
practice scenarios. In addition to the BDI-II, we included 
the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & 
Clarke, 1989) and the Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus 
Inventory (MRSI; Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2013). The 
MRSI is a six-item questionnaire that was recently devel-
oped to assess state rumination. Participants were asked 
to indicate their degree of agreement (1 = strongly dis-
agree, 7 = strongly agree) with statements such as “right 
now, I wonder why I react the way I do,” “right now, I am 
thinking about the possible meaning of the way I feel,” 
and “right now, I am conscious of my inner feelings.” The 
MRSI has shown good internal reliability and concurrent 
validity as well as sensitivity to an experimental 
manipulation of ruminative self-focus (Mor et al., 2013). 
In the present sample, the internal consistency reliability 
of the MRSI was good (α = .81).
We also used a state-of-mind form (SMF) on which 
participants indicated responses by drawing a vertical line 
on 100-mm horizontal lines ranging from not at all (0) to 
extremely (100) to statements beginning with “I am feel-
ing” and ending with “cheerful,” “in control,” “anxious,” 
“relaxed,” “worried,” “sad,” “resentful,” and “content.”
Training scenarios. Each training trial consisted of a 
scenario (similar or identical to the ones used in Experi-
ment 1), a word fragment at its end, and a context ques-
tion. In the ruminative and benign conditions, the same 
scenarios were identical and disambiguated by the word 
completing the fragment (see Table 1) in either a predom-
inantly ruminative or a benign direction. They described 
situations related to academics, personal relations, career 
issues, and extracurricular activities. Completion words 
were balanced for word length across conditions, as 
were corresponding yes/no answers to the context ques-
tions. Control scenarios were nonambiguous and non-
emotional, and the length of the completing words and 
answers to the context questions were balanced with 
those measures in the training sets. In both training sets 
and the control set, each completion word was unique. 
Of the 70 training scenarios, 12 were employed as probes 
and presented in all three conditions (including the con-
trol condition); 6 of these scenarios ended with negative 
completion words and 6 with benign words in a man-
ner fully counterbalanced within conditions. Included 
to measure training effects as training occurred, the 12 
probes were distributed evenly within the last 42 trials, 
and each block of 7 trials contained 1 probe with each 
ending. Word length and answers to the context question 
were each balanced across the probe categories.
Transfer scenarios. Transfer trials consisted of nine 
ambiguous scenarios constructed to potentiate a rumina-
tive or benign interpretation and that ended with a com-
plete sentence (i.e., fragments were not used). Each was 
presented with a title above and an answer box below, 
into which the participant-generated continuation could 
be typed. Three scenarios described academic situations, 
three interpersonal, two career, and one extracurricular. 
An example scenario follows:
The Presentation [Title]
Some important people visit the office where you 
work, and you present a project to them. It is impera-
tive that you do really well. When you are done, your 
boss comes to talk to you. Afterwards, you reflect on 
the presentation.
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Procedure. Before the training phase, participants com-
pleted the first SMF and placed it in an envelope to be 
sealed at the end of the session and never viewed by the 
experimenter. We then told the participants that the first 
task required role-playing in a variety of scenarios. They 
were instructed to read each scenario, imagine them-
selves as the main character, and think about how they 
would react as that character. Participants were asked to 
have a possible completing word in mind before hitting 
the space bar to continue to the word fragment and then 
to think of the fragment solution before typing the first 
missing letter followed by the complete word. The pro-
gram recorded the latency to type the first letter. Next, 
the context question was presented, and the participant 
typed “y” for “yes” or “n” for “no” in the answer box 
below the question. The program began with 3 practice 
trials with the experimenter present to answer questions 
and then continued with the 70 training trials.
After a second administration of the SMF, we instructed 
participants in the transfer task by asking them to read 
each scenario, imagine themselves as the main character, 
think about how they would respond, and type at least 
one sentence as an ending for the scenario. They com-
pleted two practice trials, followed by the nine transfer 
trials, and then they responded to a third SMF. Each SMF 
was added to the envelope in turn. In the subsequent 
memory task, the title and first sentence of each practice 
and transfer scenario was presented. Participants were 
asked to first recall the remainder of the previously pre-
sented scenario and to type it in the box on the screen. 
After they clicked “next,” participants were prompted to 
recall and type the ending they had previously produced. 
This distinction between memory for the scenario and 
memory for the ending was practiced with the two prac-
tice scenarios from the transfer phase. (The only purpose 
in asking for recall of endings was to ensure that partici-
pants understood this distinction so that memory intru-
sions did not merely result from carelessness regarding 
the source.)
After the memory task, we asked participants to recall 
an event or a situation that took place recently (in the 
past 2–4 weeks) that made them feel down, have feelings 
of regret, or feel bad about themselves. Then, with the 
event in mind, they wrote a description of what hap-
pened and what they felt or thought after the event by 
typing the text in a Word document. We gave them 4 min 
to complete this task, after having promised that the 
experimenter would not read the description. At the end 
of the allotted time, the experimenter reentered the room 
and asked the participant to save and close the docu-
ment. Then she left to prepare some additional forms and 
stayed away for 2 min to provide an opportunity for 
rumination about the described event. When she reen-
tered, she administered the MRSI, BDI-II, RRS, and SIAS 
separately and in that order. Participants placed each of 
these completed forms in the envelope, in turn, and 
sealed the envelope. Then participants in the ruminative 
training condition were offered a selection of funny vid-
eos, and everyone was fully debriefed.
Results and discussion
Transfer of interpretation bias. Endings to the trans-
fer scenarios were categorized as negative or benign 
interpretations by two independent raters who were 
blind to training conditions; kappas for each of the nine 
scenarios averaged to .86, and discrepancies were 
resolved by a third rater. Then the number of negative 
interpretations (with the number of benign interpreta-
tions equaling nine minus this number) was calculated 
for each participant and submitted to an analysis of vari-
ance with a between-subjects factor for training condi-
tion. The analysis revealed a significant effect, F(2, 57) = 
8.71, MSE = 2.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .23. As shown in Figure 1, 
the ruminative training condition produced more nega-
tive interpretations than did the control condition, t(57) = 
2.65, p = .010. Although there were fewer negative inter-
pretations in the benign training condition than in 
the control condition, the difference was not significant, 
t(57) = 1.47, p = .147.
Memory for scenarios. Recalled transfer scenarios 
were categorized according to whether they contained 
ideas that had not been part of the presented scenarios 
(intrusions) and, separately, according to whether those 
intrusions were negative, positive, or still ambiguous with 
respect to the rumination dimension. Kappas for each of 
the nine scenarios averaged .80 for both measures, and 
discrepancies were resolved by a third rater. Then the 
number of scenarios with such intrusions and the num-
ber of scenarios with negative and positive intrusions 
were counted separately, and each total was submitted to 
an analysis of variance. Due to experimenter error, data 
were missing for 1 participant in the benign condition.
The number of scenarios containing intrusions did not 
vary according to training condition (p = .139). This find-
ing suggests that training did not differentially establish 
inaccurate recall. Means and standard deviations are 
reported in Table 3. The analysis regarding the valence of 
intrusions included a factor for training and a factor for 
intrusion valence (negative and positive). Both main 
effects were significant, as was the interaction showing 
that the valence difference significantly depended on 
training, F(2, 56) = 3.51, MSE = 1.23, p = .037, ηp2 = .11. 
Tests of simple main effects within each training condi-
tion revealed that more negative than positive intrusions 
were produced only after ruminative training, F(1, 19) = 
6.47, MSE = 2.41, p = .020, ηp2 = .25.
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State rumination. Scores on the MRSI were obtained 
by summing responses to six items that indicated a par-
ticipant’s current ruminative state. The scores were sub-
mitted to an analysis of variance with a factor for training 
that resulted in a marginally significant effect, F(2, 56) = 
3.13, MSE = 32.66, p = .051, ηp2 = .10.3 As shown in 
Table 3, compared with the control condition, scores in 
the benign condition did not differ, but participants in the 
ruminative condition judged their state as more rumina-
tive, t(56) = 2.04, p = .046.
Other self-report measures. Scores on the BDI-II, RRS, 
and SIAS, obtained at the end of the session, did not dif-
fer significantly according to training condition (all Fs < 
1.0; see Table 3).
Responses to the eight items on the first administration 
of the SMF were submitted to a factor analysis by con-
ducting a principal axis factoring with oblique rotation 
(oblimin). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (.80) verified 
the excellent sampling adequacy for the analysis (Field, 
2009). Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(28, N = 60) = 122.9, 
p < .001, indicated that correlations among items were 
sufficiently large for the principal axis factoring. A Markov 
chain Monte Carlo simulation for parallel analysis and the 
scree plot both indicated that a single factor (accounting 
for 40% of the variance) best explained the structure of 
the data. Items with factor loadings of less than 0.5 were 
not retained. As a result, a composite mood score was 
created separately for each administration, averaging the 
responses to the following items: “in control,” “relaxed,” 
“worried” (reverse-scored), and “content” (Cronbach’s 
α range = .72–.77). Higher scores indicated more positive 
mood. Composite scores were submitted to an analysis of 
variance with training condition as a between-subjects 
factor and administration time as a within-subjects factor. 
A priori contrasts across levels of administration time cor-
responded to linear and quadratic trends; the first corre-
sponded to a gradual change across administrations and 
the second to a shift after training that returned to base-
line. The analysis revealed a marginally significant mood-
by-time interaction, using a Huynh-Feldt adjustment for 
violation of the sphericity assumption, F(3.55, 101.27) = 
2.47, MSE = 121.90, p = .056, ηp2 = .08. Only the quadratic 
interaction was significant, F(2, 57) = 5.17, MSE = 92.40, 
p = .009, ηp2 = .15. Follow-up tests of simple comparisons 
showed that the quadratic function was significant only 
in the ruminative condition, F(1, 19) = 5.60, MSE = 156.81, 
p = .029, ηp2 = .23. The means reported in Table 3 show 
that these participants’ moods were less positive after 
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Fig. 1. Mean number of the nine scenario continuations that were 
judged to be negative or benign (the reciprocal of negative) in each 
training condition. Error bars depict 1 SE above and below the mean.
Table 3. Memory Intrusions and Self-Report Results From Experiment 2
Training condition
Measure Benign Control Ruminative
Number of memory intrusions (out of 9) 1.79 (1.32) 2.20 (1.11) 2.75 (1.92)
 Positive 0.74 (0.73) 0.75 (0.85) 0.45 (0.61)
 Negative 0.74 (0.73) 1.00 (0.86) 1.70 (2.00)
Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory 17.6 (5.5) 18.0 (4.9) 21.8 (6.6)
Ruminative Response Scale (final) 46.8 (10.8) 46.2 (12.5) 47.4 (13.8)
 Brooding scale 10.6 (4.0) 9.8 (3.3) 11.0 (2.9)
 Reflective pondering 10.0 (3.1) 10.2 (3.1) 11.4 (4.6)
Beck Depression Inventory–II 9.8 (5.6) 11.0 (6.5) 12.0 (7.7)
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale 28.0 (11.9) 28.0 (9.2) 30.7 (15.0)
State-of-mind form (factor score)  
 Before training 60.5 (18.5) 56.0 (14.9) 62.5 (17.6)
 After training 65.2 (17.2) 59.4 (12.5) 54.1 (14.8)
 After transfer 63.9 (16.3) 60.1 (13.3) 62.0 (14.6)
Note: The table presents means for each measure. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Number of participants in each condition is 20 
in all cells except for memory measures (n = 19 for benign) and the Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory (n = 19 for ruminative). State-of-
mind form ratings were measured on a 100-point scale. The Beck Depression Inventory–II excludes the “suicide” item.
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training, but the mood returned to baseline before the 
memory test. Therefore, it would be difficult to conclude 
that memory intrusions were mood congruent or that 
mood mediated the effects on the state-rumination 
measure.4
Training latencies. Mean latencies in milliseconds to 
respond to probe scenarios during training were analyzed 
after we set aside data from 5 participants whose means 
on either negative or benign trials were greater than 2.5 
SD from the overall mean. Latencies were measured from 
the presentation of the fragment to the keystroke for the 
first missing letter. Latencies to solve benign fragments 
were longer than were those for negative fragments (mean 
benign = 2,863 ms; mean negative = 2,071 ms), F(1, 54) = 
5.86, MSE = 1,086,189, p = .019, ηp2 = .10. This main effect 
probably indicates a bias in our materials toward rumina-
tive endings because even the control condition showed 
a mean difference of 335 ms. The difference was large 
enough to make it difficult to detect an interaction with 
training conditions, even though the difference in the 
ruminative condition was more than twice the difference 
in the other two conditions (mean ruminative = 730 ms; 
mean benign = 355 ms). Moreover, these means were 
likely unstable, given their basis on only six trials. Another 
possible reason for the failure to find a significant interac-
tion with this measure, unlike a similar measure in Experi-
ment 1, is that the latency to type the missing letter was 
used instead of the latency to type the complete word. 
This method seemed to have increased the average time 
to respond and the associated variance.
General Discussion
These experiments were designed to document and sim-
ulate rumination-related biases in the interpretation of 
ambiguous events. Experiment 1 revealed that students 
with high scores on the brooding component of rumina-
tion completed word fragments to disambiguate ambigu-
ous scenarios in a negative direction faster than fragments 
that resolved the ambiguity in a benign direction, but 
they did so only if they had previously engaged in a self-
focused mental set. Experiment 2 successfully simulated 
the interpretation bias found in Experiment 1, as judged 
by the endings to open-ended scenarios produced by 
nonbrooding participants who had been randomly 
assigned to the ruminative condition. Moreover, perfor-
mance on other tasks in Experiment 2 suggested that the 
induced negative bias produced consequences for state 
rumination. One consequence was negative intrusions in 
memory for the ambiguous beginnings of the transfer 
scenarios. Of equal importance, after recalling unpleas-
ant events in their recent personal past, the newly trained 
“ruminators” reported higher levels of state rumination.
The evidence for a rumination-related interpretation 
bias in Experiment 1 is consistent with results from a few 
previous efforts to discover interpretation biases of the 
depressive kind. For example, Wenzlaff and Bates’s 
(1998) scrambled-sentence task is similar to an interpre-
tation task, given that participants make sentences with 
or without negative connotations; in their experiment 
and subsequent similar ones, they found that dysphoric 
students more often unscrambled the words to form neg-
ative sentences. These findings and others that have 
shown depression-related memory biases can be consid-
ered depressive habits of thought (Hertel, 2004). The 
most characteristic cognitive habit in depression, how-
ever, is rumination, and the results of Experiment 1 sug-
gest that a component of rumination is indeed the 
tendency to interpret ambiguity in a negatively biased 
direction. Experiment 1 results replicated previous dem-
onstrations of a ruminative-related interpretation bias 
(Mor et al., 2014), this time with materials more ecologi-
cally valid than individual homographs and, it is impor-
tant to note, with the type of stimuli frequently used to 
modify interpretation biases of other kinds.
Experimental control over an aspect of a naturally 
occurring habit permits statements about cause and 
effect.5 The transfer results in Experiment 2 indicate that 
multiple experiences in interpreting ruminatively can 
establish the habit to do so under unconstrained condi-
tions for interpreting ambiguity. Evidence for the devel-
opment of such a cognitive habit was provided in a 
near-transfer task in which the participants completed 
ambiguous scenarios by writing continuation sentences 
that were training congruent. The request to write a sen-
tence to continue a paragraph (not merely a word to end 
a sentence, as in training) is arguably less subject to 
demand characteristics than are other transfer tasks that 
present benign and negative alternatives. Participants in 
the ruminative training condition wrote more negative 
continuations than did those in the other two conditions. 
Moreover, a far-transfer task of thinking about a recent 
personal experience revealed training effects on a subse-
quent measure of state rumination.
Of course, neither set of effects can be claimed to have 
changed the way the participants think in the long term—
thankfully. And although we also cannot claim that the 
effects were short-lived, we believe they were, given that 
even longer sessions of training anxiety-related interpre-
tation biases have not been shown to last longer than a 
day or so, unless training sessions are repeated (Hertel & 
Mathews, 2011; MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). The 
important aspect of these transfer effects, for our pur-
pose, is their proof of principle. We assume that learning 
to see the dark side through experiences in the real world 
is durable in part because the “training trials” are distrib-
uted across time and context.
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Another essential feature of real-world training to 
ruminate surely is the memorial “side effect” of interpre-
tation bias: once interpreted, thus remembered. Our 
memory results are therefore important to the case for 
rumination training. Like the biased continuations of 
transfer scenarios, the memory bias occurred only with 
respect to ruminative training, although the lack of effect 
of benign training might be due to the low level of mem-
ory errors in general (i.e., floor effects in comparison 
with the control condition). Our participants were 
remarkably accurate in remembering the transfer scenar-
ios and in distinguishing them from their own continua-
tions, no doubt due to the low number of scenarios 
employed as well as to the immediacy of the recall test. 
Nevertheless, almost two of the nine scenarios were 
remembered with a ruminative slant by participants in 
the rumination training condition. This proportion is 
comparable with other demonstrations of interpretation-
based memory intrusions (e.g., Hertel et al., 2008; Tran 
et al., 2011).
In addition, we believe that even a few reconstructive 
errors are meaningful, given their reliance on interpreta-
tion biases during initial encounters and the reliance of 
those biases on individually meaningful situations. 
Specific scenarios cannot seem personally relevant to 
everyone. Bartlett’s (1932) view of reconstructive errors 
reflected similar reasoning. Moreover, in the context of 
clinical treatment, memory errors need not be numerous 
to serve as meaningful bases for ruminative episodes and 
as relevant bases for modification by therapeutic chal-
lenges. What is lacking in this analysis, however, is a 
clear demonstration of interpretation-based memory bias 
by people who self-report high degrees of rumination. 
Such a demonstration should be a high priority for future 
research, given the strong anecdotal evidence for memo-
rial confabulations in ruminative thinking.
We turn now to a consideration of the lack of evi-
dence of effects from benign training, compared with the 
control condition, because it indicates a possible limita-
tion in the use of our paradigm. One possible and admit-
tedly post hoc explanation is related to the fact that the 
scenarios all potentiate ruminative responses. Benign 
training might involve an initial ruminative interpretation 
that is counteracted when the final word leads to a 
benign resolution. This counteraction—first negative, 
then benign—possibly occurred in a way that resulted in 
benign participants’ performance on all measures being 
similar to that of control participants’ who saw only a few 
such scenarios. In short, the benign training might have 
exerted strong effects that could not be observed because 
our control condition did not control for this possibility. 
A control condition in which participants were allowed 
to find their own completions for all training scenarios 
might reveal a natural tendency to appear ruminative 
when placed in the hypothetical situations we invented. 
We believe that this condition must be included in future 
experiments, but in the meantime, it is important to con-
sider that any tendency to first interpret in a ruminative 
direction before counteraction would probably produce 
negative memory intrusions in the benign condition, and 
this outcome did not occur. Still, we recommend further 
research concerning the absence of a difference between 
the control and benign conditions. If it is truly a null 
effect, perhaps it can be attributed to the nature of the 
sample, selected in this case on the basis of preexperi-
mental tendencies not to brood when sad.
Despite its nonclinical samples, the present research is 
clinically relevant in two main ways. First, and more 
directly, our findings may help in understanding tempo-
ral fluctuations in rumination. They suggest that for peo-
ple who do not ruminate habitually (e.g., our participants), 
ruminative episodes of the sort made possible during our 
far-transfer task of pondering a recent personal event are 
more likely to arise after negative or self-involving inter-
pretations of ambiguous events. Measures taken to moni-
tor and discourage self-focused interpretations of 
ambiguity might thereby function prophylactically to aid 
resilience (e.g., Hertel & McDaniel, 2010).
Second, our evidence for causal contributions of inter-
pretation bias to aspects of rumination encourages work 
in the other direction: bright-side training for those indi-
viduals who habitually ruminate and are vulnerable to 
depression (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009). One obvious rea-
son to continue investigations of benign-interpretation 
training is its possible application in decreasing stable 
ruminative tendencies as well as state rumination. By 
adding to current efforts to identify fundamental cogni-
tive causes of rumination (e.g., Daches & Mor, 2013), our 
findings can perhaps assist in designing interventions to 
reduce this maladaptive habit. It is important that although 
there are documented efforts to apply CBM procedures 
as a treatment for anxiety (e.g., Amir & Taylor, 2012a, 
2012b), development of CBM protocols for rumination 
and depression lags behind (cf. Blackwell & Holmes, 
2010). A major goal in designing new treatments for 
depression should therefore involve extended explora-
tions of ways to decrease ruminative habits. Ruminative 
habits do not develop overnight and, therefore, will likely 
not be remediated by CBM sessions that are simply con-
ceived. Successful application of CBM will likely require 
training across various types of ambiguity and contexts to 
prevent relapse (Bouton, 2000), and training must be 
spaced (Bjork & Bjork, 2011).
In addition to manipulating interpretations of ambigu-
ity, training must incorporate other processing methods 
(e.g., Miller et al., 2013; Watkins et al., 2009). The train-
ing of cognitive control, of the sort encouraged by mind-
fulness training (e.g., Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995), 
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might ultimately be necessary to establish controlled 
opposition to old habits as new habits are developed 
(see Hertel, Holmes, & Benbow, 2013). In the meantime, 
however, we emphasize the importance of the present 
bias demonstration and simulation. Resolving ambiguity 
with a self-focused and reflective slant clearly not only is 
associated with but also contributes to ruminative 
thinking.
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Notes
1. Students who enroll in introductory psychology classes 
are representative of the population of Trinity University stu-
dents, who are mainly middle class and identify as Black/
African American (4%), Asian (7%), Latina/Latino (17%), White/
Caucasian (58%), or Other (14%). Less than 1% of students are 
older than 22 years (but our pool consisted mainly of 18- to 
19-year-olds).
2. We note the apparent trend in the social-anxiety data for a 
negative bias exhibited by brooders in the distraction condi-
tion. Without a priori prediction and significant overall effects, 
however, specific comparisons are not justified.
3. One participant in the ruminative condition chose a rating 
of 1 (not at all) for all six items and was the only participant 
to score less than 10. After discovering that the participant’s 
written description was quite negative and that her RRS score 
was relatively high, we set aside her MRSI score because we 
believed that it was not genuine.
4. When the scales were each separately submitted to analyses of 
variance, only two scales obtained significant interactions: con-
tentment, F(3.43, 97.84) = 3.16, MSE = 32.66, p = .023, ηp2 = .10 
(Huynh-Feldt adjustment due to violation of sphericity), and sad-
ness, F(4, 114) = 3.55, MSE = 176.49, p = .009, ηp2 = .11. Participants 
felt sadder and less content after ruminative training, but the 
effects had dissipated by the beginning of the memory task, as 
indicated by significant quadratic but not linear trends.
5. A reviewer of this manuscript was concerned that we are 
suggesting levels of cause corresponding to necessity and suffi-
ciency of interpretation bias in the development of a ruminative 
style. Our manipulation, like most, is capable of establishing 
evidence for contributory cause, nothing more.
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